evolution

Why Is Reciprocity So Rare in Social Animals? A Protestant Appeal

One Sentence Summary:
Game theoretic explanations of the evolution of cooperation in humans and other animals relies on assumptions -- rational players should never cooperate, cooperative behavior is explained by direct or diffuse reciprocity, animals can do the mental bookkeeping necessary to reciprocate with multiple partners over time -- that are not always or often borne out by data, necessitating new conceptual tools.
Disciplines:
Biology
Cultural Evolution
Economics
Findings:
  • Partner markets, emotions, learning, reputation all strongly influence cooperation in social animals including humans, but are ignored by conventional game theory models of reciprocal altruism, indicating a need for new conceptual tools in evolutionary game theory.
  • Evolution does not design new mental tools for each problem, but modifies existing mechanisms.
Keywords:
tit-for-tat
reputation
reciprocity
prisoners dilemma
evolution
cultural evolution
cooperation
altruism
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, Peter Hammerstein, Ed., MIT Press in Cooperation with Dahlem University Press
Date:
2003
One Paragraph Summary:

Game theoretic explanations of cooperation involving tit-for-tat strategies and reciprocal altruism are not supported by a large body of evidence. Only a small number of animal examples have been found. Simple models of repeated games do not match the circumstances of evolutionary change. Partner switching and mobility counter the assumptions necessary for reciprocal altruism as a stable evolutionary mechanism. Reciprocity requires significant mental machinery – how do organisms determine whether the actions of others are intentionally or unintentionally cooperative or uncooperative? Alternative conceptual schemas such as partner markets – making it unprofitable for partners to switch – offer alternative conceptual schemas. Emotions may play a role in mediating complex interactions in which intentionality and reputation play a part.

Towards Realistic Models for Evolution of Cooperation

One Sentence Summary:
The five major approaches to answering how cooperation emerges and becomes stable in nature (Group Selection, Kinship Theory, Direct Reciprocity, Indirect Reciprocity, and Social Learning) might be improved by not presuming asexual and non-overlapping generations, simultaneous-play for every interaction, dyadic interactions, mostly predetermined and mistake-free behavior, discrete actions (cooperate or defect), and the trivial role of social structure and social learning of individuals.
Disciplines:
Biology
Cultural Evolution
Sociology
Findings:
  • Observer-based reciprocity relaxes the requirement that each individual's likelihood of cooperating be known globally by introducing randomly selected observers. Even though interactions are only visible to these observers cooperation can still evolve showing "that cooperation may evolve through indirect reciprocity with or without global knowledge about agents' image scores."
  • Darwin's notion of the "survival of the fittest" does not specify what "fittest" refers to, and for good reason: the outcome of a behavior in each contingent situation determines its fitness. Different interpretations of "fittest" lead to different models for how natural selection works and therefore offer different explanations for the evolution of cooperation.
Keywords:
trust
reputation
reciprocity
evolution
cultural evolution
cooperation
competition
bioeconomy
altruism
agent-based model
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
MIT LCS Memorandum
Date:
2002
One Paragraph Summary:

Sociological and biological observations of humans and animals show that cooperation is an inherent part of human life and the life of many animals. This poses two questions: how do cooperative strategies become stable within evolution? And, how does cooperation emerge initially? Even though researchers have tried to answer these questions for at least a century, existing models do not fully explain why cooperation evolves. There are five major approaches: Group Selection, Kinship Theory, Direct Reciprocity, Indirect Reciprocity, and Social Learning. Each of these models explain only a few aspects of cooperation and might be improved by dropping some unrealistic assumptions: asexual and non-overlapping generations, simultaneous-play for every interaction, dyadic interactions, mostly predetermined and mistake-free behavior, discrete actions (cooperate or defect), and the trivial role of social structure and social learning of individuals.

The Parable of the Tribes

Subtitle:
A new look at how the history of civilization may have been largely shaped by the raw struggle for power between societies
One Sentence Summary:
“The parable of the tribes” is used to describe schematically how one aggressive tribe among an otherwise peaceful group can force the spread of the “ways of power” throughout the system: power becomes a contaminant that, once introduced, becomes universal abetted and magnified through innovations in organization and technology.
Disciplines:
Cultural Evolution
Political Science
Findings:
  • The evolution of civilization can be seen as a dialectic between the commonsense view of a benign striving for and choice of a humane world and a more problematic systematic selection for power and dominance over others.
  • “The parable of the tribes” is used to describe schematically how one aggressive tribe among an otherwise peaceful group can force the spread of the “ways of power” throughout the system: power becomes a contaminant that, one introduced, becomes universal abetted and magnified through innovations in organization and technology.
  • The drive for societal survival makes the selection for power among civilized societies inevitable.
  • The synthesis of the compulsive spread of power with the benign choice for the diffusion of beneficial inventions through human and humane aspirations is possible. These “different truths” need to be combined in a balanced way.
Keywords:
trust
evolution
cultural evolution
civil society
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Governance, page 5.
Date:
Autumn 1984
One Paragraph Summary:

“The parable of the tribes” is used to describe schematically how one aggressive tribe among an otherwise peaceful group can force the spread of the “ways of power” throughout the system: power becomes a contaminant that, once introduced, becomes universal abetted and magnified through innovations in organization and technology. The way out of this dilemma for societal evolution is the realization that while the selection for power does govern much of the evolution of civilization, people can also simultaneously shape their destinies through humane choices. The parable of the tribes is not the sole force directing civilization's evolution, only an extremely important one. The balance is critical.

One Page Summary:

The commonsense view of social evolution as the product of choices made in the marketplace of cultural possibilities resulting in the continuous betterment of the human condition is flawed.

The rise of civilization, paradoxically, reduced the natural limits separating societies. In such a situation, Schmookler's Parable of the Tribes describes how, in a situation in which two or more actors desire to exploit a limited resource, power becomes important and a contaminant of the possibility of peaceful co-existence:

All of a group of tribes living within reach of each other choose peace. However, if all but one choose peace, there are four possibilities for the threatened neighbors:

  • Destruction.
  • Absorption and enslavement.
  • Withdrawal to a less desirable place.
  • Imitation of the aggressive behavior.

Technological innovation and “improvement,” far from making things inevitably better, can extend the reach of aggressors throughout the world.

Cultural homogenization and the diminishment of diversity happens both through benign, commonsense choice (i.e., innovations as improvements) as well as through compulsion by dominant aggressors.

The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation

One Sentence Summary:
Given a variety of strategies ranging from cooperative to combative, cooperative retaliatory strategies tend to be the most stable but remain vulnerable to invasion.
Disciplines:
Political Science
Sociology
Findings:
  • All strategies in iterative prisoner's dilemma games are vulnerable to invasion and therefore inherently unstable.
  • Tit-for-Tat (cooperative) strategies are the most stable. These strategies can withstand higher levels of invasion by competing strategies.
  • All strategies have a threshold of stability, if a certain percentage of the population adopts these strategies they can be self-maintaining.
Keywords:
cultural evolution
equilibrium
evolution
game theory
prisoners dilemma
reciprocity
tit-for-tat
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Journal
Date:
June 1997
One Paragraph Summary:

Previous theorists had been divided regarding the stability of Tit-for-tat strategies in prisoners Dilemma gaming. Bendor and Swistak show, through seven theorems, that all strategies can be overwhelmed. There are, however, thresholds of stability where certain nice and retaliatory strategies can withstand large invasions of alternative strategies. At sufficient strength a strategy can either overwhelm the invader, support subcultures of strategy, or co-opt in the invader to a given level of invasion. Even nice and retaliatory strategies have a breakdown point, however. The authors conclude that the anything less than 100% cooperation would be inherently unstable.

One Page Summary:

Theorists have posited that pure tit-for-tat strategies in iterative prisoners dilemma games were invulnerable. Is this correct? The authors seek to answer this question by examining the ability of various prisoners dilemma gaming strategies to withstand invasion by other competing strategies.

Bender and Swistak examine a gaming strategy universe that includes the strategies:

  • Tit for tat - a player will initially cooperate and then in future rounds mimic the behavior of their opponent.
  • Tit for 2 Tats - a player will cooperate for the first two rounds and then defect in rounds where their opponent defected in the previous two.
  • Suspicious Tit for Tat - a player will initially defect and then will mimic their opponent in future rounds.
  • Always Defect
  • Always Cooperate
  • Grim Trigger - Begin by cooperating, if opponent defects then always defect afterward.

These strategies were examined in pure conditions where only one existed, and then competing strategies were introduced. If a given strategy could withstand incursions by competing strategies it was deemed "stable".

Stability proved to be a continuum. All strategies proved to have points of equilibrium. At this point, a strategy can withstand its maximum level of incursion. That point is that strategy's maximum stability.

The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

One Sentence Summary:
The genetic algorithm uses computer simulations to evolve different strategies for playing Prisoner's Dilemma games, and by observing the interactions of populations of agents over many runs, it is possible to make useful observations that could generalize to human behavior – such as the tendency of reciprocation to establish itself and spread if cooperating agents are able to encounter one another.
Disciplines:
Biology
Computer Science
Economics
Political Science
Information
Findings:
  • Genetic algorithms, developed for complexity and artificial life research, can be used to evolve strategies for playing Prisoner's Dilemma games that are well-adapted to different environments, and thus can be a probe of possible dynamics of human cooperation.
  • From a random start, populations of Prisoner's Dilemma strategies evolve away from cooperation to less cooperative rules, but after a number of runs, those players that reciprocate when encountering cooperation lock into mutually beneficial reciprocal cooperation: reciprocity, once established, can spread through a population that is originally dominated by non-cooperative strategies.
  • Genetic algorithms are highly effective method of searching for successful strategies in very large possibility spaces.
Keywords:
agent-based model
complexity
evolution
game theory
prisoners dilemma
reciprocity
tit-for-tat
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Date:
1987
One Paragraph Summary:

John Holland at University of Michigan developed a means of testing computer problem-solving methods by applying a method based on Darwinian evolution: agents (program) have a phenotype (the strategy the program uses for problem solving) and a genotype (the way strategies are represented in their programming code). Means of reproduction and mutation are specified. Agents interact with each other in a rigorously specified simulation, and the effectiveness of each agent is evaluated in a particular environment in relation to its interactions with other agents; successful strategies are reproduced at a higher rate than less successful strategies; pairs of successful offspring strategies are mated by combining genetic material; mutation is introduced. Simulations can be halted after specified numbers of runs and analyzed, then restarted. In about a quarter of simulation runs with sexual reproduction, better strategies than Tit-for-Tat evolved, and after a random start, populations tend to first evolve away from cooperation as less cooperative rules succeed more often, but can evolve back toward stable cooperation states if cooperative strategies encounter one another and reciprocate.

Swarm Smarts

One Sentence Summary:
Insect studies on emergent intelligence in swarms of unintelligent actors has practical relevance to distributed computing, robotics, and other applications; for example, foraging insects use pheromone trails to select the shortest paths to food, a strategy that has been used to solve the famous "traveling salesman problem" in computer science.
Disciplines:
Biology
Computer Science
Findings:
  • Intelligence can be an emergent property resulting from the cooperative dynamics of distributed simple individuals. “Dumb” parts connected properly can yield smart results.
  • When intelligence is distributed across a network of individuals, then the system as a whole is better able to adapt well to changing environments, and it becomes robust at dealing with damage.
Keywords:
agent-based model
complexity
evolution
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Scientific American
Date:
March 2000
One Paragraph Summary:

Insect studies on emergent intelligence in swarms of unintelligent actors has practical relevance to distributed computing, robotics, and other applications; for example, foraging insects use pheromone trails to select the shortest paths to food, a strategy that has been used to solve the famous "traveling salesman problem" in computer science. Systems with distributed collective intelligence are more robust because they can adapt quickly to a variety of situations.

One Page Summary:

Insect studies on emergent intelligence in swarms of unintelligent actors has practical relevance to distributed computing, robotics, and other applications; for example, foraging insects use pheromone trails to select the shortest paths to food, a strategy that has been used to solve the famous "traveling salesman problem" in computer science. Systems with distributed collective intelligence are more robust because they can adapt quickly to a variety of situations.

Foraging ants select the shortest paths to food. They are so efficient that ant models have been used to solve the famous “traveling salesmen problem,” a classic in computer science, which concerns finding the shortest route that will take a salesman through a group of cities. Successive iterations over path networks (paths that have been discovered) results in the shortest routes getting reinforced and the longest ones getting abandoned. The outcome is an optimal path length for ant foraging.

Also, artificial ants provide the best solution to the classic quadratic assignment problem, in which the manufacture of a number of goods must be assigned to different factories so as to minimize the total distance over which the items need to be transported between facilities. There exist many such “optimization problems”, such as telephone routing. Also, individual robots have been programmed to push a box to a destination without communicating.

In another project, a model that was initially introduced to explain how ants cluster their dead and sort their larvae has become the basis of a new approach for analyzing financial data. “The ant-based approach enables the data to be visualized easily, and it boasts one intriguing feature: the number of clusters emerges automatically from the data, whereas conventional methods usually assume a predefined number of groups into which the data are then fit. Thus, antlike sorting has been effective in discovering interesting commonalties that might otherwise have remained hidden.”

Again using a biological system as a model, scientists have devised a technique for scheduling paint booths in a truck factory. The method optimizes variables like paint usage and time spent, as well as implementing load-sharing between paint booths in the case of breakdowns.

“Indeed, the potential of swarm intelligence is enormous. It offers an alternative way of designing systems that have traditionally required centralized control and extensive preprogramming. It instead boasts autonomy and self-sufficiency, relying on direct or indirect interactions among simple individual agents. Such operations could lead to systems that can adapt quickly to rapidly fluctuating conditions.”

Six-Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age

One Sentence Summary:
Healthy social, technical, biological and professional networks are built on cooperative frameworks that enable them to quickly spread information and phenomena regardless of beneficial or malicious intent; this appears to be a deep structural characteristic of "small-world" or "scale-free" networks that have a relatively small number of hubs that enable extensive interconnectivity across large numbers of nodes.
Disciplines:
Biology
Business
Anthropology
History
Cultural Evolution
Computer Science
Technology
Physics
Economics
Political Science
Sociology
Psychology
Information
Mathematics
Findings:
  • 'Six-degrees' type separation spans social, physical, and mental distances.
  • Social networks have certain degrees of discord, but are recognized and utilized by people via group associations that make up our social identities.
  • For individuals, separations of more than two degrees nearly equate to being strangers.
  • For the transmission of ideas, fashion, or viruses, six degrees can nearly equate to being directly linked.
  • Throughout most networks, ideas promulgate via clusters who spread information or infection to other clusters through shared membership or proximity (or “shortcuts”).
  • Thoughts or ideas remain benign or contained until their natural growth reaches a critical threshold or phase transition; at this point they either die out or overwhelm the population.
  • Common networks can be simultaneously vulnerable and robust. This can be a strength, allowing the network to change and adapt to new information or threats. However these characteristics can also rapidly transmit contagions throughout the network and overwhelm it.
Keywords:
networks
interdependence
hierarchy
group forming networks
game theory
evolution
equilibrium
cultural evolution
cooperation
communication
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Norton Press
Date:
2003
One Paragraph Summary:

Author Duncan Watts helped found the science of network theory. In Six Degrees he describes the evolution of the science. This narrative covers each step in the philosophical evolution to provide the reader with the context as well as the numbers behind the findings. Starting with Milgram's six-degrees studies from the 1950s as a base, they investigate the small-world problem and identify the mechanisms by which networks operate. They conclude that the solution to the small world problem reveals a series of balancing acts. Depending on context, people are either extremely connected or perceptually fragmented; networks are robust or fragile; and ambiguity can create opportunity or be a harbinger of a network's demise.

One Page Summary:

Six Degrees begins in the beginning. Stanley Milgram's initial small world studies are analyzed. His findings in seeing if a group of people in Nebraska can get a letter to someone in Massachusetts are scrutinized. Milgram left a puzzle. Mathematically, six degrees of separation can be shown and intuitively it is appealing. But do social networks actually work that way?

Initially, Watts steps into the world of pure mathematic theory. Graph theory and random graphs are employed to build potential worlds in which connections can be made. These tools are detailed and their histories explained.

Watts and his colleagues then take the science to new levels, by introducing sociology, epidemiology, economics, and business models into this new multi-disciplinary science. Immediately, each new field of study brings with it new insights into network dynamics.

This convergence of disciplines reveals the social, transportation and technological networks that make up our world. These networks are, ultimately, made up of individuals. Individuals in turn relate back to the networks and define how they operate.

Socially, people relate to their network by clustering. Clusters are logical organizations of network elements. In a social context, we might cluster in terms of a religion, a favorite author, a school we are attending or an affinity for a type of food. Some of these have very close physical distance, while others have a social distance with members spread out over a large area.

Networks of this type are, to various extents, “scale-free” networks. If graphed these networks roughly follow a classic power law trend where the level of connectivity between two nodes in a network increases dramatically as more nodes are connected. Real-world scale-free networks tend to have highly connected hubs which rapidly, purposely, and efficiently transmit pertinent or pervasive content from one location to another. In social circles, these are networkers. In the airline network these are hub airports. In traffic they would be freeway interchanges.

Due to this architecture, the Internet and modern air transport have combined to greatly decrease the role of proximity in our social networks. This has had great impacts on commerce, tourism, cultural sensitivity and other social factors. However, it has also led to great risks in the transmission of diseases, sensitivity to distant economic fluctuations, and rapid spread of misinformation.

These dynamics create a type of network that Duncan calls simultaneously robust and vulnerable. Their strength and weakness is that, with rapid transmission from cluster to cluster, anything can move quickly from one location or group to another. He uses the example of Toyota, whose network of suppliers was organized in such a way as to quickly compensate for and recover from a potential economic catastrophe.

Stable scale-free networks do not rely on a rigid hierarchy to provide direction in times of crisis. Rather, the structure of the network itself can rapidly respond to an unforeseen situation.

Their network was arranged in such a way as to foster and reward communication. This communication helped cope with ambiguous or unplanned situations. Rather than paralyzing Toyota while people waited for a decision from a rigid hierarchy, the contractors in the network were able to analyze the calamity and provide a rapid response to it.

As mentioned above, this robustness also rapidly transmits malicious content as well. The Melissa Virus, SARS and Ebola are analyzed to show why the network did or did not transmit them and, when it did, how they eventually died out.

Watts ends this book by summarizing that the multidimensional nature of social distance is sometimes counterintuitive and subjective. People can feel close in a network sense to people they are physically distant from and, conversely, socially distant from people physically nearby.

He continues by warning that social and physical distances have shrunk. People can quickly travel from place to place and economies are highly interdependent. The sheer number of dependencies in the modern world may yield surprising results from seemingly insignificant actions.

He finishes by showing the stability of our networks with the example of how New York adapted to the 9-11 attacks. The City bounced back to semi-normal operations within a week. During the disaster, the best laid plans of emergency operations staff were scuttled by the utter unavailability of facilities and services designed to copy with disasters. The network will provide.

Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the Contemporary Media Environment

One Sentence Summary:
The changing nature of technologies of information and communication has presented a case for reconceptualizing collective action, using the principle of boundary-crossing between private and public domains.
Disciplines:
History
Technology
Sociology
Findings:
  • Collective action theory, traditionally conceptualised by Olson (1965), has illustrated a range of perspectives on collective action. By presenting the changing nature of technologies of information and communication, this paper argues for the need to reconceptualize collective action theory to accommodate the modern scenarios of collective action. It is important to note that by this rationale the authors do not intend to present a view that traditional accounts of collective action theory are wrong or inadequate. There are scenarios (even in the media environment of today) by which the traditional collective action theory accounts stand – and it is not within the scope of the paper to examine those accounts. Instead, this paper aims to argue that new forms of collective action have emerged, and collective action theory must be reconceptualized to accommodate them.
Keywords:
cooperation
evolution
group forming networks
interdependence
networks
open source
prisoners dilemma
privatization
public goods
Published in:
Communication Theory, Vol 15, No. 4, pp 365-388
Date:
November 2005
One Paragraph Summary:

The authors first present a traditional account of collective action theory, and more importantly the assumptions by which the theory was developed: the problem of “free riding” and the importance of formal organisation as a way to overcome this problem.


The authors very laudably present a number of scenarios challenging these assumptions. Mediated by technology, these contemporary examples demonstrate the changing nature of free-riding, organisations, and organising in the contemporary media environment. These changes ultimately build the case for reconceptualizing collective action theory based on the “nature of transitions between private and public domains”. This may appear, at first glance, to be an inadequate basis to account for the possible outcomes of collective action; but the authors argue that various forms of the private-public boundaries can take place. This basis is also based on the argument that "boundary-crossing phenomena lie at the heart of new forms of technology-based collective action, and they also form the general class of which the traditional free-riding decision is one special, albeit very important, subset."


Armed with this reconceptualized view, the paper validates this against a number of empirical examples and discusses also the technological, societal, and informational implications associated with this reframed view.

One Page Summary:

Recent years have seen a series of questions asking the applicability and usefulness of traditional collective action theory to certain contemporary phenomena. To name an example, Olson's (1965) proposition that small groups are more successful than larger ones in his account of collective action theory can now be widely contested with evidence from contemporary networks such as the highly successful Indymedia (a large network of journalists, writers, and everyday people organised around participatory media principles).

The paper first examines traditional collective action theory in relation to two central elements: the problem of free-riding and the importance of formal organisation as one important way to overcome it. The challenges presented by new uses of information and communication technologies address specifically to these fundamental elements.

A number of examples are presented, to drive the point that collective action theory has evolved or departed from its traditional concept especially with respect to free-riding (do I contribute or free-ride) and the role of, and dependence on organisation. Some examples are:

  1. “Battle in Seattle”, in which a far-flung network of groups «used e-mail, the Web, and chat rooms to engage in a largely self-organising protest against the policies of the World Trade Organisation» (pp 370).
  2. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBLM): «a core strength of the campaign, which still seems to be ill understood by many, has always been its loose structure» (pp. 370).
  3. «participating in various groups and public forums in which people's useful contributions emerge from an interactive process rather than the explicit pursuit of a goal» (pp 371).
  4. «posting information on a web page or weblog, contributing to discussion on an electronic bulletin board» (pp 372).
  5. Open source projects (pp 375).
  6. Spontaneously organised smart mobs (Rheingold, 2002) aimed at public goods (pp 376).

These examples effectively illustrate how the nature of free-riding, organisations, and organising have changed in the contemporary media environment. In the case of the problem of free-riding, the binary decision of whether one contributes or free-ride is no longer apparent. Instead, the individual frequently go back and forth through a process of interaction and negotiation for collective action. In many of these scenarios, decisions to free-ride or contribute can also no longer be easily discerned.

The rise of new technological and participatory media have also made communication methods that used to be exclusive to formal organisations, now available for individuals. Changing structures of organisation that are made possible by communication technologies have also resulted in the ability of social movements and groups to take on certain functions of formal organisations — even surpassing the possibilities of formal organisations. Again, the boundaries are blurred, «between traditional hierarchical forms and flexible network structures».

By studying these phenomena, collective action theory is now reframed using the principle of boundary-crossing between private and public. In this context, when an individual cross a boundary between private and public realms, and when this boundary is crossed by two or more people in conjunction with a public good, collective action is said to have occurred. This is a rich frame by which several scenarios in the current contemporary media environment can be accommodated:

  • the ease of transforming private discourse to public discourse, without any specific dependence on central organisation (e.g. private responses to an e-mail discussion which eventually becomes public)
  • The absence of a central organisation prompting people to share their email lists (transforming private domains into a public domain of collective action)
  • The Web as a vehicle for crossing boundaries (information that are privately created may one day become useful publicly)

The facilitation of private-public boundaries results in exchanges that could arguably advance collective action. Technologies that help to identify, for example, private interests, experiences, and acquaintance once identified as shared between people can prompt collective action. Other than permitting the constitution of pubic spheres around commons interests, this focus would also accommodate the continuum by which individuals and groups can easily move back and forth between private and public realms.

Further thoughts:

The notion of using the private-public boundary crossing as the principle to explain contemporary types of collective action is a very interesting one, especially in relation to the commons paradigm in the media environment. Such reconceptualization of collective action is also necessary, in light of the various types of convergence that the world is witnessing today. The convergence of technologies and growing interdependence between people and their uses of technologies, converging communities and organisations, and convergence in media as they continuously evolve over time.

Having said this, there is also a number of theories and constructs which I think would be very useful to study along with the work raised by this paper. For example, borrowing the lens of structuration theory (Giddens, 1986) to look at how the nature of technologies in use reflect the structural and agency properties of the private and public realms would enhance understandings around the social processes of these technologies (how technologies influence and are influenced by people). The theoretical constructs of the commons, such as the Prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy as conceived by Hardin (1968) would also be relevant to study with respect to the free-riding problem and the role of organisations raised by traditional collective action theory. And along with this paper, it may also be worthwhile to reframe the commons concept in light of the contemporary scenarios of the commons.

References

Bimber, B., Flanagin, A. J. and Stohl, C. (2005) Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the Contemporary Media Environment. Communication Theory, 15 (4), 365-388.

Giddens, A. (1986) The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Hardin, G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 62, 1243-1248

Rheingold, H. (2002) Smart mobs: the next social revolution, Perseus Books Group, Cambridge.

Nature's Magic: Synergy In Evolution And the Fate of Humankind

One Sentence Summary:
Synergies that convey advantages drive and accelerate biological and cultural evolution by providing a package of independent elements that confer benefits many times greater than those conferred by individual elements: in biology, synergies of independently evolved traits can lead to the development of the power of flight or the emergence of humans as the dominant species; in humans, complex, coordinated activity over sustained periods leverages the power of physical tools, cultural discoveries, and social organization.
Disciplines:
Biology
Economics
Findings:
  • Synergy, "the combined or cooperative effects produced by the relationships among various forces, particles, elements, parts, or individuals in a given context – effects that are not otherwise possible," is a key driver of biological and human cultural evolution by providing immediately useful packages of benefits.
  • Certain packages of different traits, strategies, tools, norms – such as those involved with the emergence of group foraging or, much later, agriculture convey such powerful immediate survival advantages on the human groups that use them that social-cultural change happens far more quickly than it would through Darwinian evolution.
  • Human cooperation leverages synergies of tools, knowledge about the environment, social and cultural practices, to economic advantage – the payoff for cooperation for a group is high enough to overcome the individual resistance and other barriers to bringing the elements together.
  • There are at least five, perhaps more, distinct paths to cooperation and complexity in biological evolution: altruism, reciprocity, functional interdependence, mutualism, and parasitism.
Keywords:
altruism
bioeconomy
cooperation
cultural evolution
ecology
evolution
game theory
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Cambridge University Press
Date:
2003
One Paragraph Summary:

The differential survival of packages of interdependent components, organisms, or people leads to the emergence of higher-level self-interests that transcend the interests of the parts and convey amplified benefits to the aggregation of components, from the symbiotic origins of mitochondria and chloroplasts to symbiotic microorganisms in the digestive systems of ruminants and humans, to social insects, to the evolutionary leap from tree-dwelling primates to savanna-dwelling humans. Cooperative synergies at the level of the cell, organism, species, and ecology have been central, not peripheral to the evolution of life. The evolution of human cultural traits such as social complexity, language, social foraging, the use of fire and cultural transmission of tool use and implement creation, settled agriculture, invention of technologies and symbolic communication of means for inventing technologies was both driven by synergies and necessitated new social arrangements that led to new synergies. Synergetic arrangements can be tested by removing any one element and observing whether the aggregate organism, ecology, or society can continue to exist without it.

One Page Summary:

Bacteria colonies that migrate and forage and form joint structures via chemical signaling, social insects that engage in joint problem solving behaviors via chemical signaling, symbiotic relationships between ruminants from termites to cattle with cellulose-digesting bacteria, Margulis' evidence for the symbiogenesis of mitochondria and hypthoses that flagella originated from the joining of free-swimming spirochetes with energy-producing but less-mobile microorganisms, the probably evolution of flight from a suite of synergistic functional changes, the emergence of protohumans are all cited by Corning as evidence that synergies play a central, not a peripheral role in evolution of complex life forms: "Synergy has played a key role in the progressive evolution of complex systems in nature. However, complexity is not an end in itself; it's a consequence of the innovations that produce more potent forms of synergy. Synergy is the 'driver.'"

William E. Hamilton's papers on "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior" in 1964 formalized the neo-Darwinian explanation of altruistic behavior as conferring benefits on close kin, but Robert Trivers' 1964 "Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism" decoupled kinship, cooperation, and altruism by offering evidence that the helping organism acts with the assumption that low-cost, low-risk assistance to another now will be repaid later – reciprocity.

Game theoretic models were driven to more realistically match human and biological behavior than Axelrod's and Hamilton's models when zoologist Martin Nowak and mathematician Karl Sigmund created "Pavlov," a Prisoner's Dilemma strategy based on "win-stay, lose-shift" that introduces punishment. Corning objects to inclusive fitness theory, reciprocal altruism, tit-for-tat as adequate explanatory frameworks because they exclude interactions that provide synergistic combined effects and are self-policing because they are interdependent – the way two oarsman are interdependent when trying to cross a river if they each have one oar. Corning claims "The intellectual fascination of the Prisoner's Dilemma game may have led us to overestimate its evolutionary importance."

Rejecting single-cause "prime mover" hypotheses for either biological or cultural evolution, Corning lists "five maybe six distinct paths to cooperation and complexity in evolution:" altruism, reciprocity, functional interdependence, mutualism, and parasitism.

In regard to humans, Corning points to specific probable synergistic packages that enabled proto-humans to evolve from tree-dwelling primates, for language to evolve as an adaptation on precursors, for hunting and gathering culture to dominate and spread, for fire use to be culturally maintained, and for settled agriculture to take root and replace nomadic foraging and hunting as the dominant human form of social organization. Asking how a small, lightweight primate that can't fly or run very fast, lacking natural defensive weapons, but having bipedal gait, manipulative hands, omnivorous digestive system and large brain managed to shift to an earthbound habitat, broaden its resource base, and expand its range, Corning proposes that "In a patchy but relatively abundant woodland environment that was also replete with predators, competitors , and sometimes hostile groups of conspecifics, group foraging and collective defense/offense was the most cost-effective strategy. There were immediate payoffs (synergies) for collective action that did not have to await the plodding pace of natural selection….There may well have been group selection, but it was not based on altruism. It involved what the economists call 'collective goods' or 'public goods.'"

Corning agrees with Jared Diamond that the emergence of agricultural civilization, empires, and wars of conquest in the fertile crescent 10,000 years ago was due to what Diamond himself called a "package" of ecological circumstances and cultural inventions that worked together synergistically: domesticated, genetically altered plants and animals, draft animals, technologies for plowing, cutting, threshing, grinding, food transport and storage, cooking, processing hides and fibers, sewing, manufacturing tools of stone, bone, and wood, as well as access to reliable fresh water sources, abundant fuel, long-distance trade, and defense against raiders. As a result, ten to one hundred times more people can be fed from one acre than from hunting-gathering, and a settled lifestyle permitted a reduction of the spacing of births from a four year separation among nomads to two years, leading to rapid population growth.

Corning cites contemporary examples of synergistic cultural evolution involving the creation of new forms of collective action, together with new toolsets. The Igorot people of the remote mountains of Luzon, in the Philippines, use a vast, elaborate, intricately constructed combination of terraces, dams, canals, and ponds to grow rice sustainably and with remarkable efficiency. It was originally thought that the system was thousands of years old, but anthropologist Charles Drucker turned up evidence indicating that lowlanders who had practiced slash-and-burn agriculture for millennia were forced to migrate to the highlands when Spanish invaders seized choice lowlands. The sustainable high yields of Igorot rice farming depends on constant replenishment of soil nitrogen in places where there is not a natural abundant supply. The Igorot use ponds of blue-green algae that live in symbiosis with the rice plants, receiving carbon dioxide from the rice in exchange for fixing nitrogen. In order to use and maintain this new, complex technological and ecological system the former slash-and-burn lowlanders had to invent a new social and political system involving the disciplined coordination of many family groups.

The Great Basin Shoshone of North America, studied by Julian Steward in the 1930s, forage in very small family groups, with plants providing 80% of their calories. In winter, however, several families gather in larger camps near an abundant resource and trade information, teach each other skills, and find mates. During rabbit drives, groups of 75 or more coordinate efforts deploying nets hundreds of feet long. A division of labor is temporarily established between net holders and beaters, under the supervision of a temporary rabbit boss.

Work by Gintis, Bowles, Fehr and Gächter indicate that strong reciprocity among humans is egoistic, not altruistic or cooperative, and depends on aggressive punishment of cheaters. This is related to work by Boyd and Richerson on group-serving norms of "fairness." Corning notes: "…the principle of fairness came to play a central role in reconciling conflicting claims of self-interest within the groups/bands/tribes that were indisipensable to our ancestors' survival and reproductive success over many thousands of generations."

Man the Hunted: Primates, Predators, and Human Evolution

One Sentence Summary:
The authors demonstrate that homo sapiens is occasionally a prey species today, that existing apes and monkeys are hunted extensively by various predators, and that various early Homo sapiens ancestor fossils show marks consistent with predation.
Disciplines:
Anthropology
Cultural Evolution
Findings:
  • Contrary to much previous thought on the evolution of Homo sapiens, the authors demonstrate that existing evidence supports the theory that fossil hominids, like modern apes – and people in some parts of the world today – were a prey species, and group behavior is in part a defensive adaptation.
Keywords:
cooperation
cultural evolution
evolution
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Westview Press
Date:
2005
One Paragraph Summary:

The most popular theory among paleoanthropologists is that ancestral hominids were most likely “hunter apes” – with their increasing stature and brain power evidence of their success in becoming the top predator themselves. This is, at least in part, due to sample bias among existing apes and monkeys being studied as analogs for such ancestors … studies have consistently shown low predation rates. The authors note, however, that scientists studying predators find apes and monkeys to be common prey species. The authors demonstrate that the fossil record is consistent with their theory that ancestral hominids were a prey species, caution that the existing "hunter ape" scenario is unlikely, and propose that numerous aspects of modern human behavior, including collective action and cooperative sociality, are due to the existence of ancestors which were prey species.

One Page Summary:

The theory that ancestral hominids were hunters has achieved considerable popularity. The authors note that there is considerable evidence that ancestral hominids were more likely a prey species. There are three major lines of evidence:

  • Modern humans are occasionally prey species for certain predators, especially for tigers in parts of modern India and Bangladesh … people wear masks on the backs of their heads in order to appear alert to potential stalkers.
  • Modern apes and monkeys are frequent prey species for a wide variety of carnivores, a fact which does not appear in publications about the animals themselves but which is widely noted in works covering the diet of the predators themselves.
  • Ancestral hominid fossils show the marks of various predators – tooth, claw, and talon marks – that are consistent with predation.

The authors demonstrate the prey-nature of early hominid ancestors. Their speculations as to what this means in evolutionary and behavioral terms, however, are weaker. This is because it is a long way (in both time and, potentially, place) from Australopithicus afarensis to H. sapiens … the use of tools and fire, for instance, may well have modified behavior inasmuch as the immediate ancestors of H. sapiens became a more formidable prey species.

The question as to what behaviors are derived from those ancestors which were commonly prey animals remains open for speculation and future work. That said, the authors present a challenge to those who maintain the view that humankind’s ancestors were hunters from the earliest times.

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