Biology

Why Is Reciprocity So Rare in Social Animals? A Protestant Appeal

One Sentence Summary:
Game theoretic explanations of the evolution of cooperation in humans and other animals relies on assumptions -- rational players should never cooperate, cooperative behavior is explained by direct or diffuse reciprocity, animals can do the mental bookkeeping necessary to reciprocate with multiple partners over time -- that are not always or often borne out by data, necessitating new conceptual tools.
Disciplines:
Biology
Cultural Evolution
Economics
Findings:
  • Partner markets, emotions, learning, reputation all strongly influence cooperation in social animals including humans, but are ignored by conventional game theory models of reciprocal altruism, indicating a need for new conceptual tools in evolutionary game theory.
  • Evolution does not design new mental tools for each problem, but modifies existing mechanisms.
Keywords:
tit-for-tat
reputation
reciprocity
prisoners dilemma
evolution
cultural evolution
cooperation
altruism
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, Peter Hammerstein, Ed., MIT Press in Cooperation with Dahlem University Press
Date:
2003
One Paragraph Summary:

Game theoretic explanations of cooperation involving tit-for-tat strategies and reciprocal altruism are not supported by a large body of evidence. Only a small number of animal examples have been found. Simple models of repeated games do not match the circumstances of evolutionary change. Partner switching and mobility counter the assumptions necessary for reciprocal altruism as a stable evolutionary mechanism. Reciprocity requires significant mental machinery – how do organisms determine whether the actions of others are intentionally or unintentionally cooperative or uncooperative? Alternative conceptual schemas such as partner markets – making it unprofitable for partners to switch – offer alternative conceptual schemas. Emotions may play a role in mediating complex interactions in which intentionality and reputation play a part.

Towards Realistic Models for Evolution of Cooperation

One Sentence Summary:
The five major approaches to answering how cooperation emerges and becomes stable in nature (Group Selection, Kinship Theory, Direct Reciprocity, Indirect Reciprocity, and Social Learning) might be improved by not presuming asexual and non-overlapping generations, simultaneous-play for every interaction, dyadic interactions, mostly predetermined and mistake-free behavior, discrete actions (cooperate or defect), and the trivial role of social structure and social learning of individuals.
Disciplines:
Biology
Cultural Evolution
Sociology
Findings:
  • Observer-based reciprocity relaxes the requirement that each individual's likelihood of cooperating be known globally by introducing randomly selected observers. Even though interactions are only visible to these observers cooperation can still evolve showing "that cooperation may evolve through indirect reciprocity with or without global knowledge about agents' image scores."
  • Darwin's notion of the "survival of the fittest" does not specify what "fittest" refers to, and for good reason: the outcome of a behavior in each contingent situation determines its fitness. Different interpretations of "fittest" lead to different models for how natural selection works and therefore offer different explanations for the evolution of cooperation.
Keywords:
trust
reputation
reciprocity
evolution
cultural evolution
cooperation
competition
bioeconomy
altruism
agent-based model
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
MIT LCS Memorandum
Date:
2002
One Paragraph Summary:

Sociological and biological observations of humans and animals show that cooperation is an inherent part of human life and the life of many animals. This poses two questions: how do cooperative strategies become stable within evolution? And, how does cooperation emerge initially? Even though researchers have tried to answer these questions for at least a century, existing models do not fully explain why cooperation evolves. There are five major approaches: Group Selection, Kinship Theory, Direct Reciprocity, Indirect Reciprocity, and Social Learning. Each of these models explain only a few aspects of cooperation and might be improved by dropping some unrealistic assumptions: asexual and non-overlapping generations, simultaneous-play for every interaction, dyadic interactions, mostly predetermined and mistake-free behavior, discrete actions (cooperate or defect), and the trivial role of social structure and social learning of individuals.

The Strategy of Affect: Emotions in Human Cooperation

One Sentence Summary:
Emotions appear to be a key regulator of behavior in cooperative relationships. Emotions affect behavior both directly, by motivating action, and indirectly, as actors anticipate others' emotional responses.
Disciplines:
Biology
Anthropology
Cultural Evolution
Sociology
Psychology
Findings:
  • Emotions furnish the most important reason why humans don't make decisions as rational actors who seek only to maximize our individual well-being.
  • Evidence indicates that besides being the subject of sonnets and the blues, emotions are a way of thinking, a non-logical but nonetheless computational system that co-evolved with the increasing sophistication of human group formation.
  • Emotions furnish a non-rational instrument for social behaviors such as bonding, trusting, judging, and monitoring that enable people to break out of the Prisoner's Dilemma and find ways to cooperate on mutual enterprises.
  • Models of cooperation based on strictly rational game-theoretic algorithms will always be incomplete until they take into account the non-rational but nevertheless instrumental role of emotion.
  • The power of emotions can be leveraged to get group members to contribute to collective self-management of resources.
Keywords:
cultural evolution
emotion
Published in:
Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (Dahlem Workshop Report), The MIT Press / Dahlem University Press
Date:
2003
One Paragraph Summary:

"Emotions appear to be a key regulator of behavior in cooperative relationships. Emotions affect behavior both directly, by motivating action, and indirectly, as actors anticipate others' emotional responses. The influence of emotions is understandable once it is recognized that (a) the ability to benefit from cooperative relationships has been a key determinant of biological fitness throughout our species' history, and (b) panhuman emotions are adaptations crafted by natural selection. Different emotions affect cooperative behavior in different ways: some emotions lead actors to forego the temptation to defect, some lead them to reciprocate harm suffered or benefits provided, and some lead them to repair damaged relationships. An important class of emotions influences cooperative behavior in part by motivating conformity to norms and/or punishment of norm violators…."

One Page Summary:

The authors distinguish between emotions that operate primarily in dyadic relationships and emotions that operate in a significant manner in collective contexts. The authors examine the evolutionary role each emotion and cite research about ways these emotions might contribute to the creation and maintenance of cooperative behaviors: "This chapter is premised on the claim that human cooperation is profoundly shaped by, and perhaps only possible because of, emotions. We will examine the manner in which different emotions shape behavior in cooperative contexts…Although framed within an evolutionary psychological perspective, our goal is not to present definitive evidence of the validity of this particular approach, but rather to spur future investigations of the role of emotions in cooperation. Toward that end, on an emotion-by-emotion basis we will both briefly describe a variety of existing findings and present a number of hypotheses, specifying discrete, testable predictions whenever possible."

Emotions that are primarily dyadic include romantic love, gratitude, anger, envy, jealousy, guilt righteousness and contempt. Romantic love is seen as a means of overcoming a barrier to the kind of cooperation we see in parenting -– the temptation to defect in the short term on a relationship that requires a long-term investment. "A number of investigators have suggested that some emotions can be understood as mechanisms design to commit people to behavior that yields long-term payoffs, thus overcoming the temptation for short-term defection. Romantic love, a universal human emotion that underpins pair bonding, appears to be such a mechanism."

Where romantic love is about how one feels about another person, gratitude addresses how one feels about somebody's behavior, and can be an emotional currency that binds one to reciprocity. "Gratitude focuses both attention and a positive, affiliative orientation on a party who has supplied the actor with a substantial benefit. In the context of its initial elicitation, gratitude seems to prompt the actor to recognize a valuable interaction partner and subsequently signal a willingness to reciprocate."

Why do people get so angry when someone cuts ahead of them in a queue or in traffic? This is clue to the evolutionary advantage of anger as a means of protecting ones own interests, but when it comes to the thus-far unexplained human propensity to punish cheaters, even at a cost to themselves, anger might be instrumental in conferring advantage to a group that requires monitoring and sanction of free riders in order to maintain a public good or create an institution for collective action: "If gratitude is elicited by receipt of a benefit, its opposite is anger, elicited by actual ar attempted exploitation or harm. More formally, anger is the response to the infliction of a cost. In addition to showing an "irrational" willingness to reward generosity, subjects in behavioral economics experiments also show an eagerness to punish uncooperative partners…Together, these results clearly demonstrate that even within the confines of finite anonymous games, angry individuals often place paramount importance on harming the transgressor, and are willing to incur substantial costs in order to do so."

The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation

One Sentence Summary:
Human emotions, customs, and institutions enable us to compete effectively with all other species by making cooperative social arrangements among ourselves – a capability that co-evolved with thumbs, speech, and tool-building.
Disciplines:
Biology
Anthropology
Cultural Evolution
Findings:
  • Hunger drove our forebears to coordinate their actions to bring down animals so large that all the meat couldn't be consumed before it spoiled. In those circumstances, everyone in the group was free to eat — even those who didn't take the risk of hunting. The meat wouldn't be available in the first place unless a few people tackled large creatures, but the benefit of the cooperative activity of a few extended even to those who had not participated in the hunt. Ridley wrote, "Big game hunting became the first public good."
  • Altruism is "an investment in a stock called trustworthiness that later pays handsome dividends in others' generosity."
  • Moral sentiments and the emotions that accompany them help enable people to cooperate and to punish those who don't.
Keywords:
cooperation
altruism
emotion
cultural evolution
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Penguin Books
Date:
1998
One Paragraph Summary:

Ridley asks why there is so much cooperation about if life is a competitive struggle, and why, in particular are humans such eager cooperators, and traces the evolution of cooperative arrangements for mutual benefit back to the origins of cellular life, the emergence of humans as social animals. Reciprocal altruism and group selection are offered as biological explanatory mechanisms, and the role of moralistic punishment in controlling free-riders links psychological, moral, and economic dimensions of cooperation. Human physiological and cultural capabilities for inventing and exploiting social exchanges – a willingness to cooperate and to punish those who don't, reputational mechanisms for increasing trust, moral sentiments that act as a kind of social glue – are key to the success of our species.

The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

One Sentence Summary:
The genetic algorithm uses computer simulations to evolve different strategies for playing Prisoner's Dilemma games, and by observing the interactions of populations of agents over many runs, it is possible to make useful observations that could generalize to human behavior – such as the tendency of reciprocation to establish itself and spread if cooperating agents are able to encounter one another.
Disciplines:
Biology
Computer Science
Economics
Political Science
Information
Findings:
  • Genetic algorithms, developed for complexity and artificial life research, can be used to evolve strategies for playing Prisoner's Dilemma games that are well-adapted to different environments, and thus can be a probe of possible dynamics of human cooperation.
  • From a random start, populations of Prisoner's Dilemma strategies evolve away from cooperation to less cooperative rules, but after a number of runs, those players that reciprocate when encountering cooperation lock into mutually beneficial reciprocal cooperation: reciprocity, once established, can spread through a population that is originally dominated by non-cooperative strategies.
  • Genetic algorithms are highly effective method of searching for successful strategies in very large possibility spaces.
Keywords:
agent-based model
complexity
evolution
game theory
prisoners dilemma
reciprocity
tit-for-tat
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Date:
1987
One Paragraph Summary:

John Holland at University of Michigan developed a means of testing computer problem-solving methods by applying a method based on Darwinian evolution: agents (program) have a phenotype (the strategy the program uses for problem solving) and a genotype (the way strategies are represented in their programming code). Means of reproduction and mutation are specified. Agents interact with each other in a rigorously specified simulation, and the effectiveness of each agent is evaluated in a particular environment in relation to its interactions with other agents; successful strategies are reproduced at a higher rate than less successful strategies; pairs of successful offspring strategies are mated by combining genetic material; mutation is introduced. Simulations can be halted after specified numbers of runs and analyzed, then restarted. In about a quarter of simulation runs with sexual reproduction, better strategies than Tit-for-Tat evolved, and after a random start, populations tend to first evolve away from cooperation as less cooperative rules succeed more often, but can evolve back toward stable cooperation states if cooperative strategies encounter one another and reciprocate.

Swarm Smarts

One Sentence Summary:
Insect studies on emergent intelligence in swarms of unintelligent actors has practical relevance to distributed computing, robotics, and other applications; for example, foraging insects use pheromone trails to select the shortest paths to food, a strategy that has been used to solve the famous "traveling salesman problem" in computer science.
Disciplines:
Biology
Computer Science
Findings:
  • Intelligence can be an emergent property resulting from the cooperative dynamics of distributed simple individuals. “Dumb” parts connected properly can yield smart results.
  • When intelligence is distributed across a network of individuals, then the system as a whole is better able to adapt well to changing environments, and it becomes robust at dealing with damage.
Keywords:
agent-based model
complexity
evolution
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Scientific American
Date:
March 2000
One Paragraph Summary:

Insect studies on emergent intelligence in swarms of unintelligent actors has practical relevance to distributed computing, robotics, and other applications; for example, foraging insects use pheromone trails to select the shortest paths to food, a strategy that has been used to solve the famous "traveling salesman problem" in computer science. Systems with distributed collective intelligence are more robust because they can adapt quickly to a variety of situations.

One Page Summary:

Insect studies on emergent intelligence in swarms of unintelligent actors has practical relevance to distributed computing, robotics, and other applications; for example, foraging insects use pheromone trails to select the shortest paths to food, a strategy that has been used to solve the famous "traveling salesman problem" in computer science. Systems with distributed collective intelligence are more robust because they can adapt quickly to a variety of situations.

Foraging ants select the shortest paths to food. They are so efficient that ant models have been used to solve the famous “traveling salesmen problem,” a classic in computer science, which concerns finding the shortest route that will take a salesman through a group of cities. Successive iterations over path networks (paths that have been discovered) results in the shortest routes getting reinforced and the longest ones getting abandoned. The outcome is an optimal path length for ant foraging.

Also, artificial ants provide the best solution to the classic quadratic assignment problem, in which the manufacture of a number of goods must be assigned to different factories so as to minimize the total distance over which the items need to be transported between facilities. There exist many such “optimization problems”, such as telephone routing. Also, individual robots have been programmed to push a box to a destination without communicating.

In another project, a model that was initially introduced to explain how ants cluster their dead and sort their larvae has become the basis of a new approach for analyzing financial data. “The ant-based approach enables the data to be visualized easily, and it boasts one intriguing feature: the number of clusters emerges automatically from the data, whereas conventional methods usually assume a predefined number of groups into which the data are then fit. Thus, antlike sorting has been effective in discovering interesting commonalties that might otherwise have remained hidden.”

Again using a biological system as a model, scientists have devised a technique for scheduling paint booths in a truck factory. The method optimizes variables like paint usage and time spent, as well as implementing load-sharing between paint booths in the case of breakdowns.

“Indeed, the potential of swarm intelligence is enormous. It offers an alternative way of designing systems that have traditionally required centralized control and extensive preprogramming. It instead boasts autonomy and self-sufficiency, relying on direct or indirect interactions among simple individual agents. Such operations could lead to systems that can adapt quickly to rapidly fluctuating conditions.”

Six-Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age

One Sentence Summary:
Healthy social, technical, biological and professional networks are built on cooperative frameworks that enable them to quickly spread information and phenomena regardless of beneficial or malicious intent; this appears to be a deep structural characteristic of "small-world" or "scale-free" networks that have a relatively small number of hubs that enable extensive interconnectivity across large numbers of nodes.
Disciplines:
Biology
Business
Anthropology
History
Cultural Evolution
Computer Science
Technology
Physics
Economics
Political Science
Sociology
Psychology
Information
Mathematics
Findings:
  • 'Six-degrees' type separation spans social, physical, and mental distances.
  • Social networks have certain degrees of discord, but are recognized and utilized by people via group associations that make up our social identities.
  • For individuals, separations of more than two degrees nearly equate to being strangers.
  • For the transmission of ideas, fashion, or viruses, six degrees can nearly equate to being directly linked.
  • Throughout most networks, ideas promulgate via clusters who spread information or infection to other clusters through shared membership or proximity (or “shortcuts”).
  • Thoughts or ideas remain benign or contained until their natural growth reaches a critical threshold or phase transition; at this point they either die out or overwhelm the population.
  • Common networks can be simultaneously vulnerable and robust. This can be a strength, allowing the network to change and adapt to new information or threats. However these characteristics can also rapidly transmit contagions throughout the network and overwhelm it.
Keywords:
networks
interdependence
hierarchy
group forming networks
game theory
evolution
equilibrium
cultural evolution
cooperation
communication
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Norton Press
Date:
2003
One Paragraph Summary:

Author Duncan Watts helped found the science of network theory. In Six Degrees he describes the evolution of the science. This narrative covers each step in the philosophical evolution to provide the reader with the context as well as the numbers behind the findings. Starting with Milgram's six-degrees studies from the 1950s as a base, they investigate the small-world problem and identify the mechanisms by which networks operate. They conclude that the solution to the small world problem reveals a series of balancing acts. Depending on context, people are either extremely connected or perceptually fragmented; networks are robust or fragile; and ambiguity can create opportunity or be a harbinger of a network's demise.

One Page Summary:

Six Degrees begins in the beginning. Stanley Milgram's initial small world studies are analyzed. His findings in seeing if a group of people in Nebraska can get a letter to someone in Massachusetts are scrutinized. Milgram left a puzzle. Mathematically, six degrees of separation can be shown and intuitively it is appealing. But do social networks actually work that way?

Initially, Watts steps into the world of pure mathematic theory. Graph theory and random graphs are employed to build potential worlds in which connections can be made. These tools are detailed and their histories explained.

Watts and his colleagues then take the science to new levels, by introducing sociology, epidemiology, economics, and business models into this new multi-disciplinary science. Immediately, each new field of study brings with it new insights into network dynamics.

This convergence of disciplines reveals the social, transportation and technological networks that make up our world. These networks are, ultimately, made up of individuals. Individuals in turn relate back to the networks and define how they operate.

Socially, people relate to their network by clustering. Clusters are logical organizations of network elements. In a social context, we might cluster in terms of a religion, a favorite author, a school we are attending or an affinity for a type of food. Some of these have very close physical distance, while others have a social distance with members spread out over a large area.

Networks of this type are, to various extents, “scale-free” networks. If graphed these networks roughly follow a classic power law trend where the level of connectivity between two nodes in a network increases dramatically as more nodes are connected. Real-world scale-free networks tend to have highly connected hubs which rapidly, purposely, and efficiently transmit pertinent or pervasive content from one location to another. In social circles, these are networkers. In the airline network these are hub airports. In traffic they would be freeway interchanges.

Due to this architecture, the Internet and modern air transport have combined to greatly decrease the role of proximity in our social networks. This has had great impacts on commerce, tourism, cultural sensitivity and other social factors. However, it has also led to great risks in the transmission of diseases, sensitivity to distant economic fluctuations, and rapid spread of misinformation.

These dynamics create a type of network that Duncan calls simultaneously robust and vulnerable. Their strength and weakness is that, with rapid transmission from cluster to cluster, anything can move quickly from one location or group to another. He uses the example of Toyota, whose network of suppliers was organized in such a way as to quickly compensate for and recover from a potential economic catastrophe.

Stable scale-free networks do not rely on a rigid hierarchy to provide direction in times of crisis. Rather, the structure of the network itself can rapidly respond to an unforeseen situation.

Their network was arranged in such a way as to foster and reward communication. This communication helped cope with ambiguous or unplanned situations. Rather than paralyzing Toyota while people waited for a decision from a rigid hierarchy, the contractors in the network were able to analyze the calamity and provide a rapid response to it.

As mentioned above, this robustness also rapidly transmits malicious content as well. The Melissa Virus, SARS and Ebola are analyzed to show why the network did or did not transmit them and, when it did, how they eventually died out.

Watts ends this book by summarizing that the multidimensional nature of social distance is sometimes counterintuitive and subjective. People can feel close in a network sense to people they are physically distant from and, conversely, socially distant from people physically nearby.

He continues by warning that social and physical distances have shrunk. People can quickly travel from place to place and economies are highly interdependent. The sheer number of dependencies in the modern world may yield surprising results from seemingly insignificant actions.

He finishes by showing the stability of our networks with the example of how New York adapted to the 9-11 attacks. The City bounced back to semi-normal operations within a week. During the disaster, the best laid plans of emergency operations staff were scuttled by the utter unavailability of facilities and services designed to copy with disasters. The network will provide.

Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny

One Sentence Summary:
Wright applied to the history of civilization the same game theory that Axelrod had used to explain biological and social phenomena, concluding (controversially), that humans throughout history have learned to play progressively more complex non-zero-sum games with the help of technologies like steam engines and algorithms and metatechnologies like money and constitutions.
Disciplines:
Biology
Anthropology
History
Cultural Evolution
Computer Science
Technology
Economics
Political Science
Sociology
Findings:
  • Social complexity evolves because it brings benefits to those who participate, and one of those benefits is the capacity for increasing social complexity
  • Humans have built societies of increasing power and complexity by creating technologies, institutions, and social contracts that enable us to cooperate in new ways, on larger scales, to produce greater benefits to more people: zero-sum games. The evolution of human capacities for inventing, elaborating, diffusing nonzero-sum games is a lens for looking at a powerful driver of history.
  • Technologies, from plows to alphabets, have produced both physical power and new opportunities for complex collective action.
  • Metatechnologies such as capital markets, constitutions, and science have created both concentrations and decentralizations of wealth and power – zero-sum games don't make zero-sum competition go away. The two modes co-evolve.
  • Nonzero-sum games influence the environment to become more conducive to nonzero-sum games.
  • Nonzero-sum games are tools for overcoming obstacles to collective action.
  • Innovation, exploration, investment, persuasion, politics are tools for initiating, maintaining, increasing cooperative game-playing.
  • The evolutionary advantages of reciprocal altruism on the biological level are potentiated when they drive the development of human mental capacities such as remembering who owes you and who is a friend; increases in the mental capacity for social complexity enables the elaboration of more complex forms of social cooperation: tit-for-tat plus emotion plus mental capacity equals alliances, friendships, societies.
  • Emotions like friendship, love, and envy; traits such as trust, cheating, and punishment; and concepts such as justice and fairness can be seen as the mythic narratives humans tell ourselves to explain mechanisms we've invented for inventing, elaborating, and maintaining cooperative arrangements.
  • Just as other biologically-originated traits, such as evolution itself, have become the objects of reason, knowledge, nonzero-sum games have moved from unconscious to reasoned and planned. Understanding technologies and metatechnologies of cooperation makes it possible to design more powerful forms.
Keywords:
cooperation
complexity
cultural evolution
non zero sum
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Pantheon
Date:
1999
One Paragraph Summary:

A zero-sum game is winner-take-all. For every winner there has to be a loser, Games like the Prisoner's Dilemma have more subtle gradations of reward and punishment. In some non-zero-sum games, all players benefit if they cooperate. More people playing more complex non-zero-sum games – and converting the result to positive sums -- create emergent effects like vibrant cities, bodies of knowledge, architectural masterpieces, marketplaces and public health systems. Wright wrote that: "cultural evolution has pushed society through several thresholds over the past 20,000 years. And now it is pushing society through another one." Starkly competitive zero-sum games co-exist with increasingly sophisticated non-zero sum games. We band together to bring down the big game, then fight over how to divide it. Suffering, injustice, disparities in wealth and opportunity exist, and at the same time, more people are more prosperous, healthy, and politically free than ever before. Wright asserts that the trajectory of cultural evolution points in a generally positive direction — the more people find that they can harvest personal benefits by investing trust and practicing cooperation, the more they will invest in cooperative enterprise and help others join the venture.

One Page Summary:

Humans have taken the cooperative arrangements that benefited organisms and species at the biological level to the cognitive and social levels: the capacity to play cooperative social games that benefit all was a driver of the evolution of human intellectual capacity; increased intellectual capacity manifested in both the concrete sphere of tool-making and the abstract sphere of social relationships. Once enhanced cognitive capabilities made complex social arrangements like status, reputation, gossip, persuasion, punishment, alliance possible, human social capacities became a tool for ratcheting up cooperative game-playing capacity.

Certain technologies push human societies to reorganize at a higher level of cooperation. As an example, Wright offered the Shoshone, a Native American tribe that lived in a territory with no big game to hunt but an abundance of jackrabbits at certain times of year. Because of their stark environment, the Shoshone normally existed at a simple level of social organization, with every extended family foraging for itself. When the rabbits were running, however, the families banded together into a larger, closely coordinated group, to wield a tool too large for any one family to handle or maintain — a huge net. Working together with the net, the entire Shoshone hunting group can capture more protein per person than they could working apart. Wright declared that "The invention of such technologies — technologies that facilitate or encourage non-zero-sum interaction — is a reliable feature of cultural evolution everywhere. New technologies create new chances for positive sums, And people maneuver to seize those sums, and social structure changes as a result."

Wright noted that people who interact with each other in mutually profitable ways are not always aware that they are cooperating; he cited evolutionary psychologists to assert that unconscious underpinnings of cooperation — like affection and indignation — are rooted in genetic traits:

"… natural selection, via the evolution of 'reciprocal altruism' has built into us various impulses which, however warm and mushy they may feel, are designed for the cool, practical purpose of bringing beneficial exchange."

"Among these impulses: generosity (if selective and sometimes wary); gratitude, and an attendant sense of obligation; a growing empathy for, and trust of, those who prove reliable reciprocators (also known as "friends"). These feelings, and the behaviors they fruitfully sponsor, are found in all cultures. And the reason, it appears, is that natural selection "recognized" non-zero-sum logic before people recognized it…Some degree of social structure is thus built into our genes."

"In the intimate context of hunter-gatherer life, moral indignation works well as an anti-cheating technology. It leads you to withhold generosity from past nonreciprocators, thus insulating yourself from future exploitation; and all the grumbling you and others do about these cheaters leads people in general to give them the cold shoulder, so chronic cheating becomes a tough way to make a living. But as societies grow more complex, so that people exchange goods and services with people they don't see on a regular basis (if at all), this sort of mano-a-mano indignation won't suffice; new anti-cheating technologies are needed. And, as we'll see, they have materialized again and again — via cultural, not genetic, evolution."

The cultural innovations that reorganize social interaction in light of new technologies are "social algorithms governing the uses of technology." Wright called these social methodologies "metatechnologies.". In the Middle Ages, the metatechnologies of capitalism — currency, banking, finance, insurance — pushed the hierarchical machinery of feudal society to transform into a new way of organizing social activity, the market. "The metatechnology of capitalism then combined currency and writing to unleash unprecedented social power." Wright claimed that the emerging merchant class pushed for democratic means of governance, not out of pure altruism, but in order to be free to buy and sell and make contracts. Throughout this process, powerful people always seek to protect and extend their power, but new technologies always create opportunities for power shifts, and at each stage from writing to Internet, more and more power decentralizes: "I mean that new information technologies in general — not just money and writing — very often decentralize power, and this fact is not graciously conceded by the powers that be. Hence a certain amount of history's turbulence, including some in the current era."

Nature's Magic: Synergy In Evolution And the Fate of Humankind

One Sentence Summary:
Synergies that convey advantages drive and accelerate biological and cultural evolution by providing a package of independent elements that confer benefits many times greater than those conferred by individual elements: in biology, synergies of independently evolved traits can lead to the development of the power of flight or the emergence of humans as the dominant species; in humans, complex, coordinated activity over sustained periods leverages the power of physical tools, cultural discoveries, and social organization.
Disciplines:
Biology
Economics
Findings:
  • Synergy, "the combined or cooperative effects produced by the relationships among various forces, particles, elements, parts, or individuals in a given context – effects that are not otherwise possible," is a key driver of biological and human cultural evolution by providing immediately useful packages of benefits.
  • Certain packages of different traits, strategies, tools, norms – such as those involved with the emergence of group foraging or, much later, agriculture convey such powerful immediate survival advantages on the human groups that use them that social-cultural change happens far more quickly than it would through Darwinian evolution.
  • Human cooperation leverages synergies of tools, knowledge about the environment, social and cultural practices, to economic advantage – the payoff for cooperation for a group is high enough to overcome the individual resistance and other barriers to bringing the elements together.
  • There are at least five, perhaps more, distinct paths to cooperation and complexity in biological evolution: altruism, reciprocity, functional interdependence, mutualism, and parasitism.
Keywords:
altruism
bioeconomy
cooperation
cultural evolution
ecology
evolution
game theory
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
Cambridge University Press
Date:
2003
One Paragraph Summary:

The differential survival of packages of interdependent components, organisms, or people leads to the emergence of higher-level self-interests that transcend the interests of the parts and convey amplified benefits to the aggregation of components, from the symbiotic origins of mitochondria and chloroplasts to symbiotic microorganisms in the digestive systems of ruminants and humans, to social insects, to the evolutionary leap from tree-dwelling primates to savanna-dwelling humans. Cooperative synergies at the level of the cell, organism, species, and ecology have been central, not peripheral to the evolution of life. The evolution of human cultural traits such as social complexity, language, social foraging, the use of fire and cultural transmission of tool use and implement creation, settled agriculture, invention of technologies and symbolic communication of means for inventing technologies was both driven by synergies and necessitated new social arrangements that led to new synergies. Synergetic arrangements can be tested by removing any one element and observing whether the aggregate organism, ecology, or society can continue to exist without it.

One Page Summary:

Bacteria colonies that migrate and forage and form joint structures via chemical signaling, social insects that engage in joint problem solving behaviors via chemical signaling, symbiotic relationships between ruminants from termites to cattle with cellulose-digesting bacteria, Margulis' evidence for the symbiogenesis of mitochondria and hypthoses that flagella originated from the joining of free-swimming spirochetes with energy-producing but less-mobile microorganisms, the probably evolution of flight from a suite of synergistic functional changes, the emergence of protohumans are all cited by Corning as evidence that synergies play a central, not a peripheral role in evolution of complex life forms: "Synergy has played a key role in the progressive evolution of complex systems in nature. However, complexity is not an end in itself; it's a consequence of the innovations that produce more potent forms of synergy. Synergy is the 'driver.'"

William E. Hamilton's papers on "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior" in 1964 formalized the neo-Darwinian explanation of altruistic behavior as conferring benefits on close kin, but Robert Trivers' 1964 "Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism" decoupled kinship, cooperation, and altruism by offering evidence that the helping organism acts with the assumption that low-cost, low-risk assistance to another now will be repaid later – reciprocity.

Game theoretic models were driven to more realistically match human and biological behavior than Axelrod's and Hamilton's models when zoologist Martin Nowak and mathematician Karl Sigmund created "Pavlov," a Prisoner's Dilemma strategy based on "win-stay, lose-shift" that introduces punishment. Corning objects to inclusive fitness theory, reciprocal altruism, tit-for-tat as adequate explanatory frameworks because they exclude interactions that provide synergistic combined effects and are self-policing because they are interdependent – the way two oarsman are interdependent when trying to cross a river if they each have one oar. Corning claims "The intellectual fascination of the Prisoner's Dilemma game may have led us to overestimate its evolutionary importance."

Rejecting single-cause "prime mover" hypotheses for either biological or cultural evolution, Corning lists "five maybe six distinct paths to cooperation and complexity in evolution:" altruism, reciprocity, functional interdependence, mutualism, and parasitism.

In regard to humans, Corning points to specific probable synergistic packages that enabled proto-humans to evolve from tree-dwelling primates, for language to evolve as an adaptation on precursors, for hunting and gathering culture to dominate and spread, for fire use to be culturally maintained, and for settled agriculture to take root and replace nomadic foraging and hunting as the dominant human form of social organization. Asking how a small, lightweight primate that can't fly or run very fast, lacking natural defensive weapons, but having bipedal gait, manipulative hands, omnivorous digestive system and large brain managed to shift to an earthbound habitat, broaden its resource base, and expand its range, Corning proposes that "In a patchy but relatively abundant woodland environment that was also replete with predators, competitors , and sometimes hostile groups of conspecifics, group foraging and collective defense/offense was the most cost-effective strategy. There were immediate payoffs (synergies) for collective action that did not have to await the plodding pace of natural selection….There may well have been group selection, but it was not based on altruism. It involved what the economists call 'collective goods' or 'public goods.'"

Corning agrees with Jared Diamond that the emergence of agricultural civilization, empires, and wars of conquest in the fertile crescent 10,000 years ago was due to what Diamond himself called a "package" of ecological circumstances and cultural inventions that worked together synergistically: domesticated, genetically altered plants and animals, draft animals, technologies for plowing, cutting, threshing, grinding, food transport and storage, cooking, processing hides and fibers, sewing, manufacturing tools of stone, bone, and wood, as well as access to reliable fresh water sources, abundant fuel, long-distance trade, and defense against raiders. As a result, ten to one hundred times more people can be fed from one acre than from hunting-gathering, and a settled lifestyle permitted a reduction of the spacing of births from a four year separation among nomads to two years, leading to rapid population growth.

Corning cites contemporary examples of synergistic cultural evolution involving the creation of new forms of collective action, together with new toolsets. The Igorot people of the remote mountains of Luzon, in the Philippines, use a vast, elaborate, intricately constructed combination of terraces, dams, canals, and ponds to grow rice sustainably and with remarkable efficiency. It was originally thought that the system was thousands of years old, but anthropologist Charles Drucker turned up evidence indicating that lowlanders who had practiced slash-and-burn agriculture for millennia were forced to migrate to the highlands when Spanish invaders seized choice lowlands. The sustainable high yields of Igorot rice farming depends on constant replenishment of soil nitrogen in places where there is not a natural abundant supply. The Igorot use ponds of blue-green algae that live in symbiosis with the rice plants, receiving carbon dioxide from the rice in exchange for fixing nitrogen. In order to use and maintain this new, complex technological and ecological system the former slash-and-burn lowlanders had to invent a new social and political system involving the disciplined coordination of many family groups.

The Great Basin Shoshone of North America, studied by Julian Steward in the 1930s, forage in very small family groups, with plants providing 80% of their calories. In winter, however, several families gather in larger camps near an abundant resource and trade information, teach each other skills, and find mates. During rabbit drives, groups of 75 or more coordinate efforts deploying nets hundreds of feet long. A division of labor is temporarily established between net holders and beaters, under the supervision of a temporary rabbit boss.

Work by Gintis, Bowles, Fehr and Gächter indicate that strong reciprocity among humans is egoistic, not altruistic or cooperative, and depends on aggressive punishment of cheaters. This is related to work by Boyd and Richerson on group-serving norms of "fairness." Corning notes: "…the principle of fairness came to play a central role in reconciling conflicting claims of self-interest within the groups/bands/tribes that were indisipensable to our ancestors' survival and reproductive success over many thousands of generations."

Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism.

One Sentence Summary:
Evidence is cited that strong reciprocity (repaying cooperation and punishing defection, cheating, violation of fairness norms), which plays a role in the provision of public goods and contradicts theories of selfish actors, is neither a maladaptation, nor explained in an evolutionary context by kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling.
Disciplines:
Biology
Cultural Evolution
Computer Science
Political Science
Sociology
Findings:
  • Humans repay gifts and punish cheaters of cooperation and fairness norms, even in anonymous, one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers (strong reciprocity) – contrary to theories that all humans are strictly rational and strictly self-interested actors -- and evidence suggests that the presence of a high number of strong reciprocators in human groups was an evolutionary advantage.
  • Strong reciprocity plays a decisive role in the production of public goods – strong reciprocity in the provision of public goods is enabled by the metanorm of altruistic punishment, which makes possible the maintenance of norms that are good for groups at a cost to individuals.
Keywords:
altruism
cooperation
evolution
prisoners dilemma
public goods
punishment
reciprocity
reputation
tit-for-tat
Author(s) / Editor(s):
Published in:
MIT Press in Cooperation with Dahlem University Press
Date:
2003
One Paragraph Summary:

Economic games that probe of human behavior (including games that allow punishment of cheaters and non-reciprocators), together with research by biologists, zoologists, and primatologists have delivered strong evidence that traditional assumptions of universally strictly egoistic (rationally self-interested) behavior are at least partially wrong: People repay gifts and punish cheaters, even at a cost to themselves, even among strangers in one-shot games where there is not possibility of reaping future repayment. This practice of "strong reciprocity" has been explained evolutionarily as a maladaptation. The authors of this survey marshal evidence that theories of kin selection (altruism on behalf of genetic relatives that provides reproductive advantage to those who share the altruist's genes), reciprocal altruism (gifts that are made with expectation of eventual repayment by the giftee), indirect reciprocity (gaining a reputation that could pay off in future encounters with other members of the group) costly signaling (acts that cost the actor, but which signal desirability of the signaler as a potential ally or mate) do not sufficiently explain strong reciprocity – and evidence that contradicts these theories as explanatory mechanisms. A cultural evolution hypothesis is proposed: groups that are not closely genetically related can gain survival advantage in competition with other groups if a disproportionate number of strong reciprocators are present – and the presence of strong reciprocators is only possible when cheaters are punished. At the same time, other selection pressures drive the presence of purely selfish humans. Both types coexist because they have coevolved in human cultural practice. The authors offer a beginning, not an ultimate answer, to questions about strong reciprocity, suggesting further research.

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